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I. INTRODUCTION
The grounds for vacating an arbitration award, particularly based on the
ground of "facial legal error," tend to be narrow, 1 and to vacate an award
based on such grounds is rare.2 In Broom v. Morgan Stanley D W, Inc.,
Washington's Supreme Court narrowly held that an arbitral panel's decision
to dismiss claims based on the state's statutes of limitations, in instances
where the parties to the dispute had not explicitly agreed that the statutes of
limitations would apply, was a facial legal error that provides a basis for
vacating an arbitral award. 3
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dick Broom maintained a retirement investment account with Paine
Webber from the late 1990s into mid-2000.4 When Broom's former broker
retired, a new broker took over his account. 5 While the new broker was
managing Broom's account, the account decreased in value by 25%.6
However, when his broker moved to Morgan Stanley, Broom transferred his
accounts with the broker.7 Broom's account continued to decline in worth
after this time. 8
* Broom v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 236 P.3d 182 (Wash. 2010).
1 See id. at 185-86 (discussing that Washington will only vacate an arbitration award
based on facial legal error in four narrow instances). For examples of other states that
have established narrow grounds for vacating arbitration awards on the basis of facial
legal error, see Anthony v. Kaplan, 918 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Ark. 1996); First Health Group
Corp. v. Ruddick, 911 N.E.2d 1201, 1213 (111. App. Ct. 2009); Parr Constr. Co. v. Pomer,
144 A.2d 69, 72 (Md. 1958); Washington v. Washington, 770 N.W.2d 908, 912 (Mich.
2009); Tiberghein v. B.R. Jones Roofing Co., 856 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 2004); State of New
Jersey, Office of Employee Relations v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 711 A.2d 300, 307
(N.J. 1998); and Welty v. Brady, 123 P.3d 920, 924 (Wyo. 2005).
2 Lane Powell Attorneys and Counselors, Washington Supreme Court Holds Statutes
of Limitations do not apply to Arbitration Proceedings, Aug. 2, 2010, http://www.
lanepowell.com/10270/statutes-of-limitations-do-not-apply-to-arbitration-proceedings/
[hereinafter Lane Powell].
3 Broom, 236 P.3d at 188.





OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
After Broom's death, Broom's children, who were the beneficiaries of
his account, "filed a notice of claim with Morgan Stanley" in September
2005.9 The claim alleged that Morgan Stanley was guilty of "negligence,
failure to make suitable investment recommendations, violation of state and
federal securities law, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and
omissions, failure to supervise, breach of contract," and violating the state of
Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA). 10
The dispute between Broom's beneficiaries and Morgan Stanley was
submitted to an arbitration panel pursuant to a previous arbitration
agreement. 11 Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss the Brooms' claims, making
various assertions, including that the state statutes of limitations barred
consideration of all claims. 12 The arbitration panel ruled the statutes of
limitations barred consideration of all Broom's claims except for the claim
alleging a violation of the Washington CPA. 13 The Brooms filed a motion
asking the arbitration panel to reconsider their ruling and Morgan Stanley
moved for a dismissal of the CPA claim. 14 The panel granted Morgan
Stanley's request for dismissal. '5
After the arbitration panel's ruling, Broom's beneficiaries filed a
complaint in a Washington trial court and filed a motion to vacate the
arbitration award, arguing the award contained a "facial legal error because
state statutes of limitations do not apply to arbitration."' 16 The trial court
agreed, and vacated the arbitration award.17
After the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding, Morgan
Stanley successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for
review. 18 The Supreme Court of Washington considered two questions on
review. First, "[i]s 'legal error on the face of the award' a valid ground for a
court to vacate an arbitration award?" 19 Second, "[i]f so, may arbitrators
apply state statutes of limitations to bar the claims presented?" 20




13 Id. at 183-84.
14 Id. at 184.
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III. HOLDING AND REASONING
In addressing the above two questions, the Supreme Court of
Washington ultimately held, in a 5-4 decision, that under the Washington
Arbitration Act (WAA), facial legal error provides grounds for vacating an
arbitration award and arbitration is not considered an "action" that is subject
to the statutes of limitations set by the state.21
A. Arbitration Awards Displaying Facial Legal Error
The Supreme Court of Washington has consistently held that the WAA
allows courts to vacate arbitration awards when they find that the award
contains a facial legal error.22 A WAA provision permits a court to vacate an
arbitration award when "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made." 23 In construing this provision, the Supreme
Court of Washington has stated that "facial legal error constitutes an instance
in which arbitrators 'exceeded their powers.' ' 24
While the current WAA does not explicitly include facial legal error as a
ground that justifies vacating an arbitration determination, the previous state
arbitration statute directly stated that facial legal error was grounds for
vacating arbitration decisions. 25 In 1995, the Supreme Court of Washington
stated in Boyd v. Davis that facial legal errors were grounds for vacating
arbitration decisions under the current state arbitration act.2 6 In Broom, the
Supreme Court of Washington stated that there was no reason to alter the
Boyd decision, as the state presumes that the legislature is aware of judicial
interpretations of statutory law and thus when there is no change in statutory
language "after a court decision the court will not overrule clear precedent
interpreting the same statutory language. '27
Despite state precedent that prevents the re-interpretation of statutory
language by a court, Morgan Stanley and two amici argued the interpretation
of the WAA viewing facial legal error as a grounds for vacating an
arbitration award "is harmful" and should be reversed "because it
21 Broom, 236 P.3d at 186, 188.
22 Id. at 184-85.
23 Id. at 184 (referencing the former RCW 7.04.160(4)).
24 Id. at 185.
25 Id.
26 Id.; see also Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Wash. 1995).
27 Broom, 236 P.3d at 185.
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undermines the purposes of arbitration: finality and efficiency." 28 The Court
refused to accept this argument, however, stating the defendant's argument
painted an overly broad characterization of the legal error standard.29 Rather,
the Court stated that "the facial legal error standard is a very narrow ground
for vacating an arbitral award" that furthers the objectives of arbitration-not
one that permits a court to "search . . arbitral proceedings for any legal
error[,] look to the merits of [a] case[, or] reexamine evidence." 30
B. Applicability of State Statutes of Limitations to Arbitration
Proceedings
In Broom, the parties had agreed that National Association of Securities
Dealers Code of Arbitration Procedure (NASD Code) would govern their
arbitration proceedings; however, no provision of the arbitration agreement
explicitly stated whether the a party could assert defenses to claims based on
the state statutes of limitations. 31 Thus, the determination of whether or not
the state statutes of limitations could act as a bar to Broom's arbitration
claims was an issue for the court to decide.32
Morgan Stanley argued that even if facial legal error is considered to be a
legitimate reason for vacating arbitration awards, the arbitration panel did not
make a facial legal error in this case.33 Specifically, Morgan Stanley asserted
it was not a facial legal error for the arbitration panel to apply the state
statutes of limitations to the Brooms' claims for two reasons. 34 First, Morgan
Stanley argued that the NASD Code the parties agreed would apply to the
arbitration proceedings allows "arbitration panels to apply state statutes of
limitations" at their discretion.35 Second, Morgan Stanley argued that
previous cases decided by the Supreme Court of Washington considered
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 185-86. The Supreme Court of Washington also noted that "the facial legal
error standard does not permit courts to conduct a trial de novo in reviewing an
arbitration award." Id.
31 Id. at 186.
3 2 Id.
33 Broom, 236 P.3d at 186.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 186-87. In making this argument, Morgan Stanley referenced section 10304
of the NASD Code. Id.
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arbitral proceedings "actions" for purposes of the state statutes of
limitations. 36
With regard to Morgan Stanley's arguments, the Supreme Court of
Washington stated that the correct interpretation of the NASD Code relevant
to the importation of state statutes of limitations was not dispositive in the
case. 37 Rather, the Court stated that it needed to "determine independently
whether [Washington] statutes of limitations may apply to arbitral
proceedings." 38 The rationale for this analysis lies in the Court's statement
that "[a]lthough arbitrators are empowered to interpret the NASD Code, their
interpretations [are] bounded by Washington's case law and statutes." 39
In Broom, the Court stated it is the statute at issue that determines
whether or not arbitral proceedings are considered "actions." 40 The Court
established that Revised Code of Washington's catch-all statutes of
limitations provision, as well as the code's "general rule governing statutes
of limitations" "refer only to 'actions' and make no mention of
arbitrations." 41 In addition, the WAA and the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (RUAA), which has been enacted in the state of Washington, 42 use
language that explicitly distinguishes arbitrations from judicial
proceedings. 43 The Court pointed out neither the WAA nor the RUAA
referred to arbitration as an "action." 44 This distinction, as well as the
legislature's "apparent approval of the [Court's previous] statutory
interpretation" distinguishing the two, weigh in favor of distinguishing
arbitrations from "actions" under the Washington law relevant in Broom. 45
As a result, the Court concluded that the arbitration panel's application of the
36 Id. at 186-88.
37 1d. at 187.
38 Id.
39 Broom, 236 P.3d at 188. This is where the dissent differed in opinion from the rest
of the court. Id. at 189 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). In her dissent, Chief Justice Madsen
stated that the majority decision "fails to give effect to the parties' contractual agreement
to arbitration under the" NASD Code. Id. (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 187.
41 Id. at 187-88.
42 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, RUAA and UMA Legislation from
Coast to Coast, Disp. RESOL. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2005, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=266
00.
43 Broom, 236 P.3d at 188.
44Id.
45 Id.
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state statutes of limitations to dismiss the Brooms' claims was a facial legal
error that warranted vacating the panel's decision.46
However, the Broom decision does not leave parties without recourse
against "stale and untimely claims." 47 The Court noted that parties can
contractually agree to apply state statutes of limitations to their arbitration
agreements.48 In this case, however, the parties failed to include a contractual
provision pertaining to the applicability of state statutes of limitations, and
the Court did not view the NASD Code provision that granted arbitrators the
discretion to interpret limitations provisions as sufficiently explicit. 49
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A concern exists that Broom allows claims that would be time-barred in
court to be brought before arbitral panels-in effect providing an arena
where state statutes of limitations may be nullified. As one Seattle-based firm
stated: "Thousands of businesses[, ranging from construction to securities,]
operating in the state of Washington today utilize form contracts which
contain arbitration clauses .... [N]one [of the arbitration contracts that the
firm was] aware of affirmatively adopt[ed] a statutory limitations provision"
pre-Broom.50 Thus, arbitration agreements need to be reviewed, and form
agreements will likely need to be revised in order to prevent plaintiffs from
asserting time-barred claims.51
In constructing future arbitration agreements, parties need to be more
explicit in asserting that state statutes of limitations provisions apply if they
want to prevent the consideration of claims that would otherwise be time-
barred. When arbitration agreements apply state law, "the agreement should
articulate whether state law extends to both procedural and substantive
aspects of state law."52 One firm has reported it had begun "adding the
phrase 'to be governed by the applicable Washington statute of limitations'




49 Broom, 236 P.3d at 186-88.
50 Smyth & Mason Attorneys at Law, Arbitration Oh-O!, Sept. 8, 2010,
http://www.smythlaw.com/news/arbitration-oh-o/ [hereinafter Smyth & Mason].
51 Schwabe, Williamson, & Wyatt Attorneys at Law, Washington Supreme Court
Statutes of Limitation do not Apply in Arbitration, Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.schwabe.
com/showarticle.aspx?Show= 12023.
52 Lane Powell, supra note 2.
53 Smyth & Mason, supra note 50.
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agreements containing dispute resolution clauses should also take
Washington's ruling into consideration and establish statutes of limitations
provisions if they are attempting to prevent the assertion of stale claims.
54
Naila S. Awan
54 Cutler, Nylander & Hayton Professional Service Corporation, Intricacies of
Dispute Resolution Clauses within International Business Agreements-Key Drafting
Considerations, Aug. 5, 2011, http://cnhlaw.com/phil-cutler/intricacies-of-dispute-
resolution-clauses-within-international-business-agreements-key-drafting-considerations-
2/.
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